Let people who own stocks through pensions and funds tell companies how they want their shares voted at shareholder meetings
Steps to make it happen
- People who put money into pensions or investment funds own shares in many companies without knowing it.
- Large pension and fund managers must set up a way to ask the people who gave them money what they want.
- Savers can pick one voting policy from a few choices, such as caring for the environment or caring for workers.
- On important questions, savers can also say yes or no directly, for example by phone.
- Fund managers split their votes at each company to match the share of savers who chose each option.
- For savers who give no choice, the fund manager votes by its usual policy.
- Fund managers let any saver see how they voted on each question at each company.
- It becomes normal for everyone to know how their own money was used in company decisions.
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The proposal in detail
This proposal opens a way for people who own stocks indirectly, through pension funds, investment funds, exchange-traded funds and the like, to tell managers how they want voting rights used at shareholder meetings. It applies to pension funds and asset managers whose assets exceed a certain size; smaller managers are not required to take part and may join if they choose. The managers carry it out: they let members and investors choose one policy from several voting policies prepared in advance. Examples of policies include one that puts long-term returns first, one that gives heavy weight to climate and the environment, one that gives heavy weight to how workers and business partners are treated, and one that looks strictly at executive pay. The content of each policy and its standards for decisions are published beforehand. For high-impact questions only, such as the election of directors or a major merger, people may also state their yes or no individually. Managers use the voting rights of the shares they hold in proportion to the policies people chose. For people who state no wish, the manager votes by its standard policy, which is also made public. Procedural questions, such as changing a meeting date, are excluded. Where a manager has a conflict of interest with a company it invests in, it must disclose that fact and how it handled it. All voting results are made public, question by question.
BenefitsThe voices of the real owners of the money reach companies
The greatest benefit is that the views of the many people who actually supply the money are more likely to be reflected in companies' important decisions. Influence that was concentrated in a few fund staff is handed back in small pieces to tens of millions of savers, which eases the imbalance in which one manager's judgment moves the whole market. Asset managers also no longer have to decide alone how much weight to give the environment and society; whichever side criticizes them, they can explain that the savers chose the result. Publishing voting results makes it easier for outsiders to check whether managers are too cozy with the executives of the companies they invest in, and this strengthens accountability. People also get more chances to learn how their pensions and savings connect to society, which can build interest in how the economy works. Young people may bring a long-term view of companies, which could encourage corporate decisions that do not lean only toward short-term profit.
DrawbacksRetirement money may be dragged into fights over values
The point that opponents weigh most heavily is that the real purpose of pensions and savings is to reliably grow the future assets of the people who put money in, and if voting rights become a tool for expressing values or political claims, that purpose could be damaged. If people choose policies by sympathy rather than returns and company value falls as a result, the cost falls on the retirement of all members, including those who did not choose it. Also, many people are busy and likely only a small share will state a wish, so there is a risk of the opposite imbalance, in which eager activists or organized campaigns sway the vote with a small number of people. Concerns have also been raised that when votes are split finely, companies find it hard to read who represents the true will of shareholders, and management becomes unstable. A system that collects and counts wishes for each question at thousands of companies costs a great deal, and if that is added to fees, people who save small amounts feel the burden most. Some also point out that the work of investment experts, who talk with companies and push them to improve over time, could weaken.
Learn the background
Today, most shares of the world's listed companies are held not directly by individuals but through pension funds and investment funds. Workers' retirement money and household savings gather in a small number of large asset managers, and these firms cast votes at the shareholder meetings of thousands of companies. As a result, the judgments of a handful of fund staff greatly affect how company leaders are chosen and which way policies on the environment and labor go. Meanwhile, the people who supply the money hardly know how their funds were used on which question at which company, and they have no way to give their views. People's values on responding to climate change, treatment of workers, executive pay and similar matters differ greatly by country and by generation. Asset managers are caught in a bind in many places: if they vote with care for the environment and society, they are criticized for going against the wishes of those who supplied the money, and if they do not, they are criticized for failing in their duty. How to reconnect the voices of owners with voting rights is now an open question.
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This proposal was written in Japanese by AI (claude-opus-5-5, policy version 2026-10-15d) and translated by AI (claude-sonnet-5-5). Nobody has checked the facts. Read the original (日本語) How the AI writes