Make the government tell people after it has secretly watched them, once the surveillance is over

Steps to make it happen

  1. When the state secretly checks a person's calls, messages, or location, it keeps a clear record of it.
  2. When the check is over, the state tells that person within a set period of time.
  3. The notice says when the watching started and ended, what was checked, and who gave permission.
  4. If the state wants to wait because an investigation is still going on, it must get permission from a judge who is independent of the state.
  5. Waiting can only last for a limited time, and the state tells the person right away when the reason is gone.
  6. People who are told can see their own records and can complain in court about wrongful watching.
  7. Every year, the state publishes how many people it told and how many it made wait, so anyone can see.
  8. Even secret surveillance becomes something that people will normally learn about one day.
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The proposal in detail

This proposal covers surveillance that public bodies such as the police and intelligence agencies carry out against specific individuals. It includes intercepting communications, tracking location, breaking into devices such as smartphones, and obtaining usage records from telecom and internet companies. As a rule, the agency that did the surveillance must notify the person, in writing or a similar form, within a set period after the surveillance ends. The notice states the fact that surveillance took place, the period, the type of methods used, the law it was based on, and the body that gave permission. The agency does not have to hand over everything it collected, but the person can use a procedure to request disclosure of the records. If there is a reason to delay notice, such as an ongoing investigation or a risk to someone's life, the decision on delay is made not by the agency that carried out the surveillance but by an independent judge or oversight body. Delays are granted for limited periods and reviewed again each time they are renewed. There are also limits on how many times a delay can be extended and on the total length, and keeping something secret beyond those limits requires a stricter special review. The same time limit applies to gag orders placed on companies that are required to hand over data. For large-scale surveillance that collects the communications of many people at once, notifying each person is difficult, so it is replaced by publishing statistics on the number of cases and the range of targets. People who receive notice can seek remedies and compensation if the surveillance was illegal.

BenefitsPeople can object to surveillance they could not see

The biggest benefit is that people who were watched learn what happened to them and gain a way to challenge mistakes and excesses. With permission given in advance alone, only the side that wants to do the surveillance is heard, but with notice afterward, the surveillance is checked again from the person's own point of view. Agencies know that the person will eventually find out and may demand an explanation in court, so we can expect them to hesitate to carry out surveillance on weak grounds or for political purposes. If an independent body decides on delays and the numbers are published every year, society as a whole gets material to discuss how much surveillance is happening and how much of it is hidden. For journalists, sources, and people involved in civic activity, the worry of not knowing whether they were watched eases, and they can work more freely without holding back. The notice system also builds a habit inside agencies of keeping and managing records properly, which helps prevent the misuse and leaking of information.

DrawbacksIt could weaken investigations and public safety

From the standpoint of those responsible for public order and national security, the biggest concern is that notice could reveal investigative methods and the existence of informants, making criminal groups and terror networks more careful. Even when surveillance of one person has ended, other related investigations often continue for a long time, and notifying one person could ruin the whole investigation. When information shared by a foreign agency is involved, there is also the worry that notice could damage international cooperation. Having an independent body review delays takes staff and money, and in a society with many cases the review could become a mere formality, hollowed out so that nearly everything ends up delayed. On the other hand, rushing to give notice could hand clues to a dangerous person. Moreover, for unrelated people who were cleared of suspicion, learning that they were watched can itself cause strong anxiety and distrust, and if the notice information leaks, it can damage their reputation. The question is how to protect the legitimacy of surveillance and, at the same time, how to balance that against protecting safety.

Learn the background

With advances in technology, checking a person's calls, location, and online activity has become far cheaper and less noticeable than before. In many societies there is a system that requires permission from a court or similar body before surveillance begins, but that review happens without the person knowing, and it hears only the explanation of the side that wants to carry out the surveillance. Because people do not know they were watched, they cannot object, correct mistakes, or ask for relief from harm. In many parts of the world, cases keep coming up in which surveillance software was found on the smartphones of journalists, human rights activists, and people linked to opposition parties, and it came to light by chance through the work of researchers and news investigations. Some societies have laws requiring notice after surveillance, but the exceptions are broad, and in practice it is not unusual for surveillance to end with almost no one being told. Power that is not known is hard to check, and power that is not checked tends to go too far, and a concrete limit is needed to deal with this problem.

Tagsprivacyaccountabilityrule of lawhuman rightstransparency

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This proposal was written in Japanese by AI (claude-opus-5-5, policy version 2026-10-15d) and translated by AI (claude-sonnet-5-5). Nobody has checked the facts. Read the original (日本語) How the AI writes